A holistic aesthetic for science. by Kirchoff, Bruce K. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
A Holistic Aesthetic for Science 
 
By: BRUCE K. KIRCHOFF 
 
Kirchoff, B. K. 1995. A holistic aesthetic for science. Journal of Scientific Exploration.  9: 565- 
 578.  
 
Made available courtesy of The Society for Scientific Exploration: 
http://www.scientificexploration.org/publications.html 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
Abstract: 
All scientific work takes place within a community of specialists who define what types of 
studies. evidence  and modes of presentation are accepted as valid. A number of factors influence 
these decisions. Among them are tacit assumptions hidden in the language and practice of 
science. In recent years, philosophers, historians, linguists and feminist critics of science have 
elucidated some of these assumptions. The result has been a recognition that at least some 
scientific decisions are made simply because they "feel right." In other words, science possesses 
an aesthetic. After reviewing the evidence for the role of a scientific aesthetic, I suggest the 
conscious adoption of a new aesthetic based on love. Adoption of this aesthetic can lead us to 
change our relationship to the phenomena we study. Where Western science has mainly been 
concerned with the control of nature, an aesthetic of love can lead to an appreciation of the 
wisdom of nature. Instead of searching for causes, a science based on love can lead to a study of 
the patterns of phenomena. Within these patterns no single element is determinative. Rather, the 
pattern as a whole determines the role of the individual elements. Traditional Chinese Medicine 
serves as a powerful example of the capabilities of this pattern thinking approach. 
 
Article: 
Introduction 
Ten years ago it seemed inconceivable that within a decade it would be possible to suggest that 
scientific judgments are, and should be, based on aesthetic as well as on objective criteria. Yet 
this is the conclusion that results from the work of historians (e.g., Kuhn. 1962), philosophers 
(Longino. 1990), linguists (e.g.. Whorl', 1956), and feminist scholars (e.g., Keller, 1985, 1992) 
who are exploring the relationships between language, society and science. This paper discusses 
the work of sonic of these scholars as it relates to the development of alternate approaches to 
science. In the process, I will illustrate the role of aesthetic criteria in Western science. Science 
has inherited an aesthetic of domination over nature from at least the time of Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626) (Keller. 1985). The existence of this aesthetic removes scientific knowledge from 
the realm of the objectively true and places it in the framework of the community in which it 
occurs (Longino, 1990). The recognition of the aesthetic basis of science opens the door to other 
approaches to scientific knowledge, approaches that are based on different assumptions about 
our relation to the world. 
 
My second purpose is to suggest a new aesthetic for science. This is an aesthetic based on love. I 
believe that by consciously seeking a loving relationship to phenomena we can transform the 
way, we do science. An aesthetic based on love can be the basis for a methodology that respects 
the integrity of nature, i.e. a methodology that sees the context of a phenomenon as being as 
important as the phenomenon itself. Respect for the context has important consequences for how 
science is done. 
 
Epistemology 
I will begin with a brief synopsis of an epistemology I have found helpful in understanding the 
concept of objectivity (Steiner. 1886/1968). I have chosen this starting point because Steiner 
takes a radical approach to knowledge: an approach that can explain both how knowledge of the 
world is possible and how different scientific communities can productively view the world in 
different ways. For instance, Steiner's epistemology can help explain how both Western and 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) are effective, even though the philosophies that underlay 
them are fundamentally different. 
 
Steiner's epistemology is monistic. It conceives of the totality of the world as a unity, but a unity 
that is apprehended by human beings in a dualistic way. From one side we approach the world 
through our percepts: pure sensations devoid of meaning. From the other our thinking produces 
(or perhaps more correctly apprehends) concepts that give meaning to the sensations. Sensation 
and concept belong together in a unity that is prior to our perception of it. 
 
According to Steiner, our nature as thinking beings both gives meaning to and separates us from 
the world. Through thinking we generate the meanings we attach to the events of our experience. 
Meaning springs from our activity as thinking beings. I return to this point below. But thinking 
has another function. Through thinking we become aware of our ego, our nature as beings who 
are distinct from the rest of the world. Through thinking we experience ourselves as distinct from 
the other phenomena of our experience. In this process we differentiate ourselves from the rest of 
the world and create the conditions under which the world appears to us as a duality. If we could 
apprehend sensations and concepts together, so that we immediately and intuitively knew the 
concept(s) to associate with a given sensation, we would experience the world as a unity. When 
we were presented with the sensorial attributes of some object we would also immediately know 
the concept(s) that corresponds to that object. We would not have to exert our thinking activity in 
order to unite concept and percept. We would always immediately know the concept(s) to apply 
to an object. Many of the difficulties I discuss below have their roots in this dualistic way the 
world appears to us (Steiner 1886/1968). 
 
An excellent example of the sensorial side of reality, devoid of meaning, is given by Dillard (I 
974) who cites von Senden's (1960) work on the restoration of sight to people born blind. Von 
Senden (1960) collected accounts of operations to restore sight to people blind since birth with 
cataracts. 
For the newly sighted, vision is pure sensation unencumbered by meaning: The girl went through the experience that 
we all go through and forget, the moment we are born' She saw, but it did not mean anything but a lot of different 
kinds of brightness." Again, "I asked the patient what he could see; he answered that he saw an extensive field of 
light, in which everything appeared dull, confused, and in motion. He could not distinguish objects'
-
 Another patient 
saw "nothing but a confusion of forms and colors'" When a newly sighted girl saw photographs and paintings, she 
asked. "'Why do they put those dark marks all over them'' 'Those aren
'
t marks.' her mother explained, 'those are 
shadows. That is one of the ways the eye knows that things have shape. If it were not for shadows many things 
would look flat'' `Well, that's how things do look,' Joan answered. 'Everything looks flat with dark patches.
—
 (Dillard 
1974. p. 26) 
 
There is no meaning in pure sensation' Where then does meaning arise? It cannot be from the 
sensations themselves. They are devoid of significance, as the above example shows. Meaning 
exists in the concepts we unite with the sensations via thinking. Through thinking we reunite 
concept and sensation into the whole that was shattered by our organization. The 
concept/sensation whole is the primary reality according to Steiner. It exists prior to our grasp of 
it. In sensation we are exposed to one side of this whole. Thinking gives us the other side. We 
reunite concept and sensation through thinking. 
 
Difficulties often arise because of this two-fold way in which we apprehend the whole. Because 
we must exert ourselves to grasp the whole it is easy to believe that we create it, to believe that 
the world of our experience is merely a product of our creation. According to Steiner, this is a 
mistake. The world is a preexisting whole that appears to us in a dualistic way because of our 
organization as thinking beings. The world is a whole that we perceive from two directions. We 
should not be fooled into thinking that the concept/sensation whole does not exist just because 
we approach it from two directions instead of apprehending it directly. According to Steiner 
(1886/1968) the concepts we form of the world are as much a part of the world as are our 
sensations. Both are intimate parts of a preexisting whole. 
 
Linguistic and Cultural Influences on Knowledge 
From these considerations it would be easy to conclude that there is a specific concept that 
belongs to a given sensation. Truth would then consist in uniting the correct concept with the 
correct sensation. According to this view it would be possible to know the world "as it is" 
unencumbered by any personal element (Klocek, 1993). This view maintains that I learn nothing 
about myself when I connect a particular concept with a sensation, instead, I learn about the "true 
nature" of the world. I do not believe that this view can be supported. I do indeed learn 
something about myself by knowing what concepts I connect with a particular percept. Even in 
identifying an object as a rose 1 learn about myself' At the very least I learn what language I 
speak and language plays an important role in shaping our relationship to the world' Linguistic 
critiques of knowledge turn on precisely this point. Philosophers, linguists and feminist scholars 
have asked the very meaningful question. "How is my relationship to the world influenced by 
language and culture'?" Here I will leave philosophy and turn to the question of how my 
concepts of the world are shaped by the language I speak and the culture I inhabit. 
 
The linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956, p. 135) gives examples of how our perceptions and 
behavior are shaped by language. For some years before studying linguistics Whorf worked as an 
analyst for a fire insurance company. He compiled statistics on the physical conditions that 
surrounded the outbreak of fires. He discovered that fires are caused not only by physical factors 
but also by the meaning that people attach to certain potentially dangerous situations. For 
instance, people exercise great care around stored gasoline drums as these are perceived to 
present a high danger of fire' However, around stored empty gasoline drums people are much 
more careless. By labeling the drums empty, their conception of the drums changes. The visual 
sensation of the drum remains the same. but what the observer makes of the percept changes' [t 
changes so much that the observer's behavior changes when he is around empty drums. This is 
despite the fact that the empty drums present a greater danger of fire because of the explosive 
vapor they contain. 
 
Whorf cites similar examples of the influence of language from his work on the Hopi language 
(Wharf, 1956). In this research he dealt with a larger framework than in the previous example' 
He was concerned with how the totality of a person's conceptual world is shaped by the language 
they speak, not just how the perception of one event is shaped by language. He illuminates the 
Hopi Indian's conception of the world through a study of their language. After completing an 
extensive morphological description of the Hopi language. Whorl undertook a comparison 
between Hopi and Western European languages in order to address the questions ''(1) Are our 
own concepts of 'time.' 'space,' and 'matter given in substantially the same form by experience to 
all men, or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular languages'? (2) Are there 
traceable affinities between (a) cultural and behavioral norms and (b) large-scale linguistic 
patterns?" (Whorf, 1956. p. 138). Whorf does not suggest that there is anything as strong as a 
correlation between language and culture, but he does conclude that language is an important 
influence on culture' In order to keep this discussion short, I will restrict myself to two of 
Wharf's examples dealing with the perception of time. 
 
In Western European languages we speak of time as if it had two types of properties: order and 
quantity (see Jones 1982 for a fuller discussion of these properties). We use these two properties 
of number to characterize the corresponding aspects of time. The ordering properties of number 
refer to the characteristics that allow them to be placed in sequential order (32 comes before 33 
comes before 34, etc.). These properties are used to describe serial arrangements, not quantity. 
The quantitative properties of number refer to amount. They deal with how many items there are, 
not the order in which they occur. We use the quantitative properties of number when we say 
five apples. twelve trees, etc. In Western European languages we use the quantitative properties 
of number even when the "things" we are referring to are not "things" at all, but are of a 
qualitatively different nature. For instance, we refer to five days, two seasons, three years, etc., 
even though none of these "quantities of time" can be experienced as can five apples' Days, 
seasons, and years are not physical entities. We do not experience them in groups, yet we use the 
same linguistic form to express the number of days as we do to express the number of apples. By 
doing this we give time a spatial aspect. We treat days as if they were spatial entities that can be 
aggregated into groups. 
 
Whorl calls the process of using language to assign spatial properties to aspects of the world that 
are non-spatial, objectification. Western European languages make time into an object by 
speaking of it as if it had spatial properties. Time, can thus be manipulated like other spatial 
objects. In giving time spatial characteristics we mask our direct experience of time, which 
Whorl describes as an experience of "becoming later." 
 
The Hopi language does not allow objectification. In Hopi. the quantitative properties of 
numbers are only used to describe objects, not time. In fact, plurals in general are only used to 
refer to physical objects. Plurals are never used to refer to units of time. In Hopi. there is no 
expression equivalent to our "they stayed ten days," The equivalent phrase emphasizes the 
sequential occurrence of the days: "they left after the tenth day," In Hopi the emphasis is placed 
on the sequence of the days rather than on the quantity of days' Hopi has nothing that 
corresponds to our "length of time." In its place the Hopi use a linguistic form that allows 
specification of which of two events occurs before the other. 
 
My second example concerns verb tenses. Whorl claims that the three- tense verb system of 
Western European languages contributes to our tendency to objectify our experience of time, a 
tendency that is reinforced by other parts of our language. Three tenses allow us to conceive of 
an objective past, present and future, rather than to pay attention to our more direct experience of 
time. 
 
In Hopi, verbs have no tenses' Rather they have what Whorf refers to as validity-forms, modes 
and aspects' Validity-forms are used when the speaker reports some situation (this corresponds to 
our past and present tenses) or when he reports that he expects something to happen (our future 
tense). Thus a report is always personalized. An individual's experience is reported as his ex-
perience, not as an objective fact' Modes, the second of Whorf's categories, express the 
relationship between clauses in a sentence to indicate which of the events occurs later, earlier or 
if the events are simultaneous. Aspects, the last of the categories, deal with both degrees of 
duration and different types of tendency during duration. In Western European languages we 
usually express aspects by using metaphors to spatial qualities. We express degrees of duration 
by words such as "long," "short," "much," "great," etc., and temporal tendencies by words like 
"increase," "grow," "come," "fall," etc. Although we do use some non-metaphorical terms to 
express these aspects, there are few terms available for this purpose ("early," "soon," "very," 
etc.). Whorf gives an example of how we use spatial terms to express non-spatial situations. 
I "grasp" the "thread" of another's argument, but if its "level" is "over my head" my attention may "wander" and 
"loose touch
-
 with the "drift" of it, so that when he "comes" to his "point" we differ "widely,
-
 our "views" being 
indeed so "far apart" that the "things" he says "appear
-
 "much" too arbitrary, or even "a lot" of nonsense! (Whorf, 
1956, p. 146) 
 
In Hopi, spatial qualities are never used in a metaphorical way to refer to non-spatial events. The 
exact forms that aspects take in Hopi are hard to describe. Suffice it to say that they are never 
spatial. Because of this quality, Hopi does not allow objectification. Events are expressed in their 
relation to the speaker, not to an objective external past or present. 
 
To demonstrate how these linguistic patterns help shape the "thought world" of the Hopi, Whorf 
points to the importance of preparation in Hopi culture. 
A characteristic of Hopi behavior is the emphasis on preparation. This includes announcing and getting ready for 
events well beforehand, elaborate precautions to insure persistence of desired conditions, and stress on good will as 
the preparer of right results. Consider the analogies of the day-counting pattern alone. .. The count is by ordinals. 
This is not the pattern of counting a number of different men or things, even though they appear successively, for 
even then, they could gather into an assemblage. It is the pattern of counting successive reappearances of the same 
man or thing, incapable of forming an assemblage. The analogy is not to behave about day-cyclicity as to several 
men ("several days"), which is what we tend to do, but to behave as to the successive visits of the same man. One 
does not alter several men by working upon just one, but one can prepare and so alter the later visits of the same 
man by working to affect the visit he is making now' This is the way the Hopi deal with the future — by working 
within a present situation which is expected to carry impresses, both obvious and occult, forward into the future 
event of interest' (Whorl, I 965. p' 148) 
This example illustrates the relationship between language and culture that shapes a human 
being's perceptions of the world. Our use, in Western European languages, of both the ordering 
and quantitative properties of number to describe time makes it easy for us to conceive of time as 
countable, quantitative and objective. We can easily conceive of units of time that are divorced 
from our direct experience and can use these units to quantify duration. It is this process that 
allows us to calculate the trajectory of a thrown stone, artillery shell, or missile. These types of 
calculations are more difficult in Hopi. The time units that can be easily expressed in Hopi are 
more related to direct experience. They can be enumerated, but not easily quantified. 
 
These examples demonstrate how language and the concepts that underlie language. shape our 
conception of the world. Although a Hopi and English speaker may experience the same 
sensation and may describe the sensation in words that can be translated into one another, the 
contextual meaning of the words is often quite different. Consequentially, the speaker's 
experience of the object in its full (contextual) richness will also be different. Whorl's example of 
the importance of preparation in Hopi society is an example of the contextual richness that is 
expressed in language. 
 
Aesthetics of Western Science 
Feminist critics of science have made points about the language of science that are similar to 
Whorf's points. Language influences our scientific world view just as it influences the Hopi 
conception of the world. Feminist criticisms turn on this fact and on the observation that all 
interpretations presuppose an activity on the part of the interpreter. Interpretations are not neutral 
— merely reporting the "facts" or "data," which can more or less speak for themselves — but are 
colored by interpretation (Longino, 1990). The shade of this coloring is influenced by the 
language of science, 
 
Like natural language, scientific language only has meaning within a specific community. Within 
this community language shapes the questions that are asked and the answers that are accepted as 
valid (Keller, l985)' 
Sharing language means more that knowing the "right" names by which to call things; it means knowing the "right" 
syntax in which to pose claims and questions, and even more importantly it means sharing a more or less agreed-
upon understanding of what constitute legitimate questions and meaningful answers. (Keller, 1985, p. 130) 
 
An example of how language shapes scientific research will make this clear. Much of plant 
molecular biology is currently involved with the description of genes that play a role in various 
developmental processes (see Wessler, Meyerowitz and Freeling. 1993 for examples), Although 
much of this work is descriptive in that it identifies and describes DNA sequences and does not 
test hypotheses, the rhetoric that surrounds it is the rhetoric of experimental science. Many of the 
same molecular biologists who are active in sequencing genes (a descriptive activity) are critical 
of descriptive studies. Some even go so far as to restrict science to those aspects of the world that 
can be subjected to experimental test. Granting agencies (some divisions of the united States 
National Science Foundation, for instance) that will not fund descriptive studies, eagerly fund 
descriptions of new genes if the rhetoric of the proposal emphasizes the experimental nature of 
the project. This is a case where language plays an important role in determining what scientific 
studies are considered legitimate. 
 
For at least some feminists, linguistic considerations are also important in issues of scientific 
methodology. For instance, in one essay Keller (1985) deals with the opposition between love 
and knowledge that has been expressed in scientific language since the time of Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), the author of The New Organon (Bacon. 1620) and one of the founding fathers of 
modern science. In her essay, Keller (1985, pp. 1 l5-126) focuses on the relationship between 
emotional and cognitive experience and suggests that the opposition between love and 
knowledge leads to a contamination of objectivity with domination. Since she does not believe 
that this contamination is inevitable, she is quick to distinguish between dynamic objectivity and 
static objectivity' 
I define [dynamic] objectivity as the pursuit of a maximally authentic, and hence maximally reliable, understanding 
of the world around oneself' Such a pursuit is dynamic to the extent that it actively draws on the commonality 
between mind and nature as a resource for understanding' Dynamic objectivity aims at a form of knowledge that 
grants to the world around us its independent integrity but does so in a way that remains cognizant of, indeed relies 
on. our connectivity with that world.... I call static objectivity the pursuit of knowledge that begins with the 
severance of subject from object rather than aiming at the disentanglement of one from the other. (Keller' 1985, p. 
116- 117) 
 
Thus, Keller redefines the emotionally laden term "objectivity" to allow scientists to take a 
loving interest in the world and yet remain objective. Like others before her (Schachtel, 1959; 
Zajonc, 1983) she recognizes that dynamic objectivity demands at least a temporary suspension 
of one's own egocentric desires. 
 
Keller's consideration of the opposition between love and knowledge goes beyond the role of 
language in shaping our conception of the world. It deals with how scientific ideology (the 
Baconian opposition between love and knowledge, for example) is expressed in language. 
Ideology makes itself felt principally in the process by which particular styles, methodologies, and theories come to 
be legitimated as "good" science. Certain theories and methods are selected as "best" by a process in which scientists 
collectively choose among competing methodological and theoretical candidates. The criteria for such choices are 
complex. Inevitably, the question is not simply which theory offers the fullest explanation, the best prediction, but 
also which theory best satisfies that host of unspecifiable "aesthetic" criteria (see, for example, Kuhn, 1962: Hanson, 
1958) including which theory is most consonant with one's implicit ideological and emotional expectations. (Keller, 
1985, p. 126) 
 
If we accept that Western science depends on aesthetic criteria, the question becomes which 
criteria to choose. not whether or not science should have an aesthetic. I believe that the choice 
of an aesthetic will be fundamental to the future course of science. Keller (1985, 1992) and other 
feminists critics of science (Bordo, 1986; Harding, 1986; Shepherd. 1993; among others) have 
shown the limitations of the aesthetic of domination that has characterized science since the time 
of Bacon' This aesthetic, with its opposition between love and knowledge. has served us well, 
but I believe that it is time to consider alternatives. 
 
Modern Western science has provided many ways to improve our lives. There are few areas that 
have not been touched by these advances. We have benefited from improved communications, 
health care, transportation and more recently by the advent of computers. but these advances 
have come at a cost. The aesthetic of domination equates progress with the destruction of nature. 
It values economic advancement over community and industrialization over love for the land' 
Within limits, this aesthetic is very powerful' I believe that we have reached these limits' We 
must now search for new aesthetics that can supplement the one we have inherited from our 
predecessors. 
 
A New Aesthetic for Science 
In the remainder of this paper I suggest a new aesthetic for science and explore some of its 
characteristics and consequences. I suggest that love can serve as this new aesthetic. 
 
When we adopt an aesthetic as a guiding principle we make a statement about our relationship to 
the world. This relationship finds expression in the research that we undertake and in the 
instruments and technology we develop (Shepherd. I 993). Accepting a new aesthetic will 
change not only the questions we ask, but also the way in which we ask them. Our current 
domination based aesthetic impels us to create technologies that control nature. Because Western 
science intends a relationship of power over nature, we adopt methods and tools that allow us to 
express this intent. These tools may be as explicit as a mechanical tree harvester or as subtle as 
computer modeling, but they all express the fundamental desire to dominate nature that is 
expressed through modern science. 
 
Accepting an aesthetic based on love allows a different relationship to phenomena than is found 
in contemporary Western science' In place of models and mathematical descriptions. An 
aesthetic based on love can lead us to see the phenomena in their full richness and complexity, to 
pay attention to the patterns that arise in the phenomena as a whole. Instead of isolating certain 
features and building a model, a methodology based on love can guide us to focus on the full 
range of phenomena presented to our awareness. Within these phenomena we can learn to 
perceive the pattern that unites the individual elements. A loving approach can help us to dwell 
duly and lovingly on the phenomena themselves until we find the whole that is expressed in and 
through the phenomena. At the beginning the phenomena may appear undifferentiated and 
unintelligible, much like the visual world appears to a blind person whose sight has been restored 
(von Senden, l 960). At the end, the phenomena are ordered into a higher whole. A pattern is 
perceived in the phenomena. Thoughtful, loving observation makes possible the emergence of a 
higher perception from the undifferentiated chaos of phenomena. 
 
A metaphor for the emergence of higher order patterns from undifferentiated phenomena is the 
emergence of an image out of the seemly unpatterned pictures of random-dot stereograms 
(Baccei. 1993). At first glance, these images appear to consist of unpatterned splotches of color. 
But as the observer adjusts his focus from the surface of the picture to infinity, a stereographic 
image usually appears (Julesz., 1971). Similarly, as a scientist changes his intent from gaining 
power over nature to developing a loving understanding, he may experience patterns that 
previously remained hidden. 
 
In order for love to become a guiding principle of science we must be willing to accept changes 
in the way we know. The perception of the pattern of phenomena that is facilitated by our loving 
interest involves a change in consciousness. As scientists we are conditioned to experience the 
world in an analytic, exterior mode (Keller, 1985). Bortoft (1986) describes this mode of 
consciousness as sequential and linear, as proceeding piecemeal from one element to the next. In 
contrast, a holistic mode of consciousness is simultaneous, intuitive, non-linear, and enhances 
our ability to perceive pattern. It is concerned more with relationship than with discrete objects. 
In this mode of consciousness we are able to see the whole as unitary and primary, not merely as 
something constructed out of parts. The parts are not merely building blocks for the whole, but 
bear the impress of the whole throughout their nature. The whole is both created out of and gives 
meaning to the parts. It is to this holistic type of perception that I refer when I say that a loving 
approach to nature will necessitate a change in our consciousness. 
 
In moving from an analytic to a holistic mode of consciousness we do not need to renounce 
effective action in the world. That a holistic pattern thinking approach can be productive is 
illustrated by Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM). The Taoist philosophy that underlies TCM 
is non-causal. Instead of searching behind the symptoms for the cause of a disease, a traditional 
Chinese physician searches for patterns within the symptoms themselves (Kaptchuk, 1983; 
Maciocia, 1989). The pattern of disharmony is both created by and gives meaning to the 
symptoms' Thus, the symptoms take their meaning from their context not out of themselves' For 
instance, the symptom of a red tongue can indicate a pattern of excess "activity" (excess Yang) if 
it occurs with one set of symptoms, or a pattern of deficient "rest.' (deficient Yin) if it occurs in 
another combination. These two patterns have very different therapeutic consequences. In TCM, 
the pattern of disharmony is the disease. There is no causative agent behind the pattern. 
 
TCM is an example of a holistic approach that unites the phenomenon (symptom) and the whole 
(pattern). In this process the physician adopts a different relationship to the phenomena than we 
do in Western science. This relationship involves a closer connection to the phenomena, and 
implies a more intimate relation between the physician's own perception and thinking than is 
normally found in contemporary Western science. Developing the ability to adopt this 
relationship requires training, just as does proficiency in any field. Without training we should 
not expect to be able to apply a holistic pattern thinking approach, or to act out of the loving 
aesthetic upon which this approach is based. As scientists, we have received many years of 
analytical training. Similar training is needed to cultivate a holistic approach based on love. I 
believe that artistic training has much to offer in this regard. 
 
Uniting Part and Whole through Artistic Training 
Works of art are typified by a relationship between part and whole where the whole is created 
out of and yet gives meaning to the parts. A work of art is an integrated whole. In it we do not 
find a dichotomy between part and whole, but an integration of the parts into the larger whole 
that is the work of art. In this integration the parts participate in creating the whole and at the 
same time take their meaning from, are defined by the whole. For instance, in a Romanesque 
icon, the strong vertical elements that emphasize the preeminent position of Christ are often 
strengthened by and reflected in the forms of the saints that surround Christ's throne. The forms 
of the saints thus help create a major dynamic of the picture. At the same time, their forms reflect 
the central vertical of the icon. In this way the saints are linked to the central figure of Christ 
from whom they take their meaning (both artistically and spiritually). If they were isolated from 
the icon they would loose a portion of their meaning. Their forms would no longer be related to 
Christ. 
 
Or, to take another example, in a turn of the century cityscape the curve of a river may be echoed 
by a curving street' These sinuous movements are then set off against the cubical forms of the 
buildings to create a dynamic tension. The interaction of these forms both creates a major 
dynamic of the picture and provides the context out of which the forms take their meanings. The 
forms of the river, street and buildings are all related to each other in the composition. 
 
In these examples the individual elements both contribute to the construction of the composition 
and bear its impress. The composition is built up through the individual elements, but the 
elements are not independent of the whole. They contain the meaning that is the context in which 
they occur. They are not building blocks that can be taken from one context and placed 
seamlessly in another. The verticals of the saints both reinforce Christ's vertical form and take 
their meaning from this vertical. They would not have the same meaning in a different context. 
The cubical forms of the cityscape, uncontrasted with sinuous movement, would not produce the 
same dynamic tension as when these elements are juxtaposed. 
 
Art, like TCM, can provide a way of looking and understanding that unites the particular 
phenomena (the elements of the composition) with the whole (the work of art). Thus, artistic 
training can teach us to use our aesthetic sense to perceive the part/whole unity/duality' Through 
this training, we form the sense organs to perceive the whole as it is created out of, and defines, 
the parts. This ability forms the basis for a holistic pattern thinking that is rooted in love. 
 
In order to engage in this type of thinking we must learn to take the pattern (the whole) as 
seriously as the phenomena (the parts). It is easy to dismiss the pattern because we have been 
trained to ignore it. Our first reaction will almost certainly be that the pattern (the whole) is 
irrelevant. Instead of looking for pattern, a scientists' first tendency will most likely be to break 
the whole into parts and search for the piece that k the cause of the phenomena. Identifying 
causes is a major goal of modern Western science, based as it is on an analytic mode of thought. 
This is why training is necessary. Only training will allow us to switch modes of consciousness 
and credit the relationship between part and whole, between phenomena and pattern. 
 
The unification of part and whole in art makes artistic training well suited for the development of 
the ability to think in patterns. Once obtained, this ability can be applied to scientific work. For 
the scientifically inclined, the goal is not to become an artist, but to use artistic training as a 
means of self-development. To accomplish this goal, I suggest a course of study that includes 
some practical artistic training combined with an aesthetic study of great works of art. Lowry 
(1963) provides this type of introduction to art, an introduction that focuses on training our 
aesthetic sense' I do not believe that artistic education that is directed solely at intellectual 
understanding or solely at acquiring technical proficiency will provide the necessary basis for 
perceiving pattern. Like the state of consciousness it seeks to engender, the training should focus 
on seeing (or creating) the whole as expressed through its parts. 
 
An additional method of training was suggested by the German poet and scientist Wolfgang on 
Goethe (Lehrs, 1985). Goethe recommends training our aesthetic sense through a process he 
calls "exact sensorial imagination." In this process you first visualize a natural object as exactly 
as possible. After you examine the object closely you turn away and recreate the sensory quali-
ties of the object in your imagination. At first, it may take many glances at the object to create an 
image, but your faculty of visualization will increase with practice. At the second stage, you 
visualize a number of related forms such as sequential leaves from a single plant stern, then 
mentally transform them into one another. In this way the static forms are brought into 
movement and related to each another. As in more formal artistic training, it is important to pay 
attention to the whole form of the object, not just the details. Attention to your feelings while 
doing the exercise can assist in this process. These feelings are an expression of the object as an 
aesthetic phenomenon. They help us see the object as a whole. 
 
Objectivity 
In closing, I want to turn briefly to a central concern in developing an alternative approach to 
science: objectivity. We need not fear that by taking a pattern thinking approach we will loose 
our scientific objectivity (Longino. 1990). As Keller (1985) points out, there can be more than 
one meaning of objectivity. While Keller (1985) stresses how an individual's relationship with 
the world can create different types of objectivity, Longino (1990) emphasizes the role of 
scientific communities in creating objective knowledge. She explores the transformative role of 
criticism in removing an individual's subjective preferences from the scientific canon. 
 
Steiner's (1886/1968) epistemology allows an even more fundamental analysis of how different 
kinds of objectivity are possible. According to Steiner, the nature of thinking provides us the 
means to discover reality in connection with phenomena. His work implies that this process of 
discovery can take many different forms. Modern Western science is one form. Finding the pat-
tern within phenomena is another. The preexisting unity of sensation and concept assures that 
our thoughts are a part of reality. It does not guarantee that all of our thoughts will he in accord 
with reality, but it does provide the security of knowing that our thoughts are part of reality. We 
do not have to look behind the phenomena or to build models to contact the objectively real. We 
can find reality when we find the pattern that is inherent in the phenomena themselves. This 
pattern is discovered through our activity of thinking just as contemporary scientific models are 
discovered by the use of thought. The ability of our thinking to apprehend the conceptual side of 
the concept/sensation unity is the basis both for building models and for perceiving pattern in 
phenomena. When done carefully both methods can he objective. When done sloppily, neither 
method is objective. 
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